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The main purpose of this Final Master Degree Project is to study the impact of key audit matters 
on market reaction and audit quality in the audit report required by the International Auditing 
Standard 701. It collects and analyzes related researches in decades on the key audit matters, 
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of audit reports from companies in IBEX 35, which concluded that the key audit matters in the 
audit report of IBEX 35 companies cannot significantly affect the market reaction and improve 
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research directions. 
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1.1 Background and Significance 
Audit reports are a bridge between companies and investors, and they play an important and 
irreplaceable role in the capital market. However, the traditional standardized audit report 
format has been questioned in all aspects in terms of content and format. The focus of the 
questioning mainly lies in the following points: under the traditional audit report model, there 
are only differences in the audit opinion section, and there is a trend of homogenization of audit 
opinion types. Users often think that other parts except audit opinions lack information content, 
but the valuable information about listed companies and audit itself obtained by auditors is not 
disclosed. This forms the interests of investors, regulators and other interests in the audit report. 
The information gap between the relevant parties and the auditor; the format of the report is too 
uniform, and different types of companies in different industries only differ in the audit opinion 
section, while other contents may be completely the same. Even in the face of two companies 
with different audit opinions, it is difficult for investors to understand the risk identification 
process in the audit process through the audit report. Therefore, it is difficult for investors to 
make full use of the audit report as an important tool. In addition, the economic situation facing 
investors is becoming more and more complicated, and the risks of investment are also 
increasing. In the face of this status quo, all walks of life are increasingly calling for reform of 
financial statements, and it is urgent to give full play to the communication role of financial 
statements. 
Based on the above background, countries have begun to study the reform direction of financial 
statements. After years of research and discussion, in 2015, IAASB announced a revised series 
of auditing standards. Spain’s Instituto de Contabilidad y Auditoría de Cuentas has also revised 
Spain’s audit requirements in accordance with the latest audit standards and issued specific new 
audit standards at the end of 2016. The core requirements of the standard are to improve the 
information content of audit reports, enhance the transparency of audit work, and strengthen 
the responsibilities of auditors in relation to auditing. 
This paper studies whether the disclosure of key audit matters can bring about positive market 
reaction and improve audit quality. The research has the following significance: First, from the 
perspective of the supervisory authority, it can test the effect of the implementation of the key 
audit matter disclosure standards, so as to understand whether the disclosure of key audit 
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matters has effectively increased the information content of the audit report and enhanced its 
role of communication, and to provide basis and reference for the future direction of audit 
standard reform. Secondly, for market investors, it can provide a basis for investors’ investment 
decisions, increase their reading and understanding of the disclosed content, and increase public 
supervision of listed companies; finally, from the perspective of an auditor, it can improve 
auditing The staff's knowledge and understanding of the new standards reminds the auditors to 
communicate with the audited unit during the work process, maintain their independence, and 
improve the quality of audit services. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The research objectives of this article are: First, whether the disclosure of key audit matters has 
brought market reaction. The basis is that the reform of the ISA 701 is mainly the current 
response to the insufficient information content of the audit report. The disclosure of key audit 
matters enables investors to understand the high audit risk matters found in the audit process 
and the audit procedures carried out by the auditor. There is also awareness. Therefore, investors 
can obtain information that is more relevant to investment decisions from key audit matters, 
and the impact on investment behavior from the perspective of information transmission, which 
affects the price of securities in the capital market. Therefore, this article studies whether the 
disclosure of key audit matters has brought about a positive market reaction. 
Second, study whether the disclosure of key audit quality has an impact on the audit quality of 
listed companies. The basis is the disclosure of key audit matters, so that the content originally 
recorded in the audit papers is included in the audit report and presented to the report users. 
Therefore, during the disclosure process, the auditor will conduct audit procedures with a more 
active and rigorous work attitude, maintain good independence and conduct strict review of the 
disclosure content to maintain the accuracy of the disclosure. At the same time, the auditor will 
also communicate with the management and governance, so as to deepen the understanding of 
the audited unit and make it easier to detect fraudulent behaviors by the audited unit. Therefore, 
this article studies whether the audit quality of listed companies can be improved after the 
disclosure of key audit matters. 
The specific method is as follows: Taking IBEX-35 non-bank or insurance listed companies as 
the research main part, using the audit reports of the two years before and after the adoption of 
the ISA 701 audit standard as the data source, and using the cumulative abnormal return rate 
7 
 
and the non-discretionary accruals as the market reaction and the measurement standard of audit 
quality is an empirical study of whether the two have changed after the disclosure of key audit 
matters. 
1.3 Research framework 
The content of this article is arranged as follows: 
The first part is the introduction, which mainly elaborates the research background of this article, 
clarifies the research questions and elaborates the purpose and significance of this article. 
The second part is a literature review, which mainly sorts out the research status of key audit 
matters and the corresponding theory of audit quality, and makes general comments on the 
existing literature, thus laying the theoretical foundation of this article. 
The third part is the basic theory and research hypothesis, combined with related theories and 
the problems to be studied, put forward the research hypothesis related to this article. 
The fourth part is the research design of this article. First, the research object of this article, 
namely market reaction and audit quality, explains the measurement method, and then explains 
the method and data source of the sample selected in this article. Various variables and 
calculation methods are clearly defined, and finally the research model of this article is 
constructed. 
The fifth part is empirical research and analysis. Firstly, it statistically describes the sample data 
of key audit matters disclosed, then uses multiple linear regression analysis to analyze the 
relationship between key audit matters, market reaction and audit quality, and finally analyzes 
the results of regression and their possible reasons. 
The sixth part is the research conclusion. It summarizes the empirical results of this paper, draws 
the research conclusions of this paper, and reflects on the limitations and areas to be improved 
in the research process, and proposed future research directions. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Key audit matters 
According to the definition in ISA 701, key audit matters refer to matters that the auditor 
considers to be the most important for the audit of financial statements based on professional 
judgment. The method of confirming key audit matters is as follows: firstly, consider the matters 
communicated with the governance, and secondly, consider the matters that have been focused 
on during the audit work in the matters communicated, and determine the most important 
matters among the matters that have been focused on is the key audit matter. 
2.1.1 Research on the importance of key audit matters 
The reform of adding key audit matters to the audit report has undergone a series of discussions 
and studies. 
The International Audit and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) released Proposed 
International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 701: Communicating Key Audit Matters in the 
Independent Auditor's Report (2013) in June 2013. In it, the concept of key audit matters, as 
well as their definition methods and disclosure requirements were put forward for the first time. 
The purpose of this consultation draft is to obtain the opinions of users of the audit report on 
this reform. According to (Cordoş & Fülöp, 2015) statistical research on these feedbacks, the 
disclosure of key audit matters is an important concept for users of audit reports, and its 
introduction and applicability will have a positive impact on the audit report process. (Weirich 
& Reinstein, 2014) retained a neutral attitude on key audit matters that may be mandatory to 
disclose. They believe that the new requirements will increase audit fees and other related 
expenses, and bring uncertainty to the auditor's work. (Bédard, Gonthier-Besacier, & Schatt, 
2014), based on the study of justification of assessments (JOA), believes that the introduction 
of key audit matters will not have a significant impact on market reaction and audit quality. 
2.1.2 Research on the disclosure of key audit matters 
The confirmation of key audit matters has already given specific confirmation methods and 
procedures in the ISA 701 standard. 
In practice, the cultures and audit systems of different countries may affect the auditor's 
judgment and decision on the disclosure of key audit matters (Pinto & Morais, 2019)which may 
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bring uncertainty to users of audit reports. According to a number of research conclusions, the 
key audit matters with the highest frequency disclosed in the audit reports is related to asset 
impairment. Other high-frequency key audit matters include Revenue, Allowance for doubtful 
debt, Goodwill impairment, Taxation, Investment, Financial instruments, Valuation of 
inventories, Property valuation, etc. 
The number of key audit matters included in an audit report increases with the complexity of 
the corporate structure. However, industries subject to strict supervision and supervision, such 
as banking and finance, have fewer key audit matters in their audit reports. 
2.1.3 Research on the market effect of key audit matters 
The current researches on the market effect of key audit matters are mainly experimental and 
investigative. Based on these researches, key audit matters mainly influence investors' decision-
making in two ways, direct and indirect, thereby causing market reactions. 
In terms of direct impact, (Doxey, 2014)conducted an empirical study of listed companies on 
the UK Main Board and found that audit reports that disclose more information can provide 
new and useful information for investment and influence investor decisions. (Christensen, 
Glover, & Wolfe, 2014) also used experiments to conclude that key audit matters have a 
practical effect on investors' decision-making. (Annette, Nicole, & Jochen, 2020) found in 
experiments that professional investors' assessment of the company's economic conditions is 
affected by changes in the content of key audit matters disclosures, while non-professional 
investors have difficulty handling the information disclosed by key audit matters. On the 
contrary, some studies believe that key audit matters cannot directly influence investors' 
decision-making. The survey results of (Lennox, Schmidt, & Thompson, 2019) show that the 
disclosure of key audit matters has information characteristics, but it cannot be regarded as an 
increase in news by investors. The research of (Gutierrez, Minutti-Meza, Tatum, & Vulcheva, 
2018) also shows that other information in the audit report cannot influence short-term market 
reactions. 
From an indirect aspect, in the audit process, the reasons for adding key audit items can fully 
demonstrate the auditor’s process of making judgments in the professional process, reflecting 
the principle of professionalism, and at the same time prompting the auditor to maintain an 
audit Focus on the process. At the same time, auditors can maintain an uncompromising attitude 
in the face of unreasonable requirements of the audited unit (Lennox, Schmidt, & Thompson, 
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2019). Therefore, investors make their own investment decisions by perceiving changes in the 
independence of auditors. 
2.2 Research on the impact of audit reports on market reaction 
2.2.1 The impact of the audit opinion 
From the perspective of audit opinions, the market reaction caused by non-standard audit 
opinions and standard audit opinions is obvious, and scholars at home and abroad have 
conducted a lot of research. (Ball & Brown, 1968) first studied the stock returns after the audit 
opinions were announced. They selected 261 companies listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange as samples. They found the audit opinions by observing the stock returns during two 
years. It does have a significant impact on stock prices. (Shank, Murdock, & Dillard, 1977) also 
conducted a similar study. They divided audit opinions into standard audit opinions and non-
standard audit opinions. They studied the impact of non-standard audit opinions and found that 
non-standard audit opinions would bring negative effects to the stock market. (Ball, Walker, & 
Whittred, Audit qualifications and share prices., 1979) conducted an in-depth study on reserved 
opinions. They divided the reserved opinions into three categories, and found that investors 
would adopt different attitudes and judgments for these three types of reserved opinions, which 
resulted in different stock prices. Impact. (Estes & Reimer, 1979) studied the evaluations of 
stock analysts on stock trends, and found that analysts rated companies with unqualified 
opinions better, while those with qualified opinions were more negative. Both The difference is 
obvious, and after further research on the stock price using the event research method, it is 
found that negative opinions have affected the stock price. (Fields & Wilkins, 1991) researched 
on the announcement of qualified opinions and found that if a company with a qualified opinion 
is issued, the stock price will rise significantly after the unqualified opinion is cancelled, thus 
proving the impact of the audit opinion on investor behavior influences. 
2.2.2 The impact of specific content of the audit report 
More in-depth research found that the market can not only respond to the types of audit opinions, 
but also identify unqualified opinions with explanations, standard unqualified opinions with 
Emphasis of Matter Paragraphs. (Chen, Su, & Zhao, 2000) used the unqualified opinion and 
qualified opinion audit reports with explanatory paragraphs as samples. After performing 
regression analysis on the sample companies’ abnormal returns, they found that the unqualified 
opinions with explanatory paragraphs could be identified and appeared A lower cumulative 
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abnormal return rate. 
2.3 Research on factors affecting audit quality 
The definition of audit quality is different in academic circles, but the mainstream views are the 
following two. One is from the General Accounting Office of the United States, which believes 
that audit quality is that auditors conduct audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards, with reasonable assurance that the audited financial statements and related 
disclosures: 1. Statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles; 2. 
Major misstatements caused by errors or fraud. The other one is from (DeAngelo, 1981), (Watts 
& Zimmerman, 1983) from the definition of audit quality influencing factors. They believe that 
audit quality is the ability to discover and eliminate errors in financial reports during the audit. 
It depends on the auditor. The combined effect of professional competence and independence. 
However, the quality of audits cannot be directly measured. Generally, audit quality is measured 
by observable audit behaviors.  
The main indicators used to measure audit quality are: firm size, audit brand, earnings 
management and audit fees.  
(1) Scale of accounting firm 
(DeAngelo, 1981) found that large-scale accounting firms have more client resources and more 
income, and the greater the amount of compensation in litigation due to audit failures, the 
greater the damage to reputation. For economic reasons, larger accounting firms can curb 
speculation and improve high-quality audits. (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994) found that 
companies audited by large accounting firms are significantly less likely to be misreported than 
companies audited by small accounting firms. 
(2) Professional expertise of auditors 
(Balsam, Krishnan, & Yang, 2003) found that auditors with industry expertise can play a greater 
role in suppressing the earnings management of audited entities. (Dunn & Mayhew, 2004) 
found through research that in certain industries, audit reports disclosed by auditors with 
industry expertise are more likely to be praised by rating agencies. At the same time, when a 
listed company intends to transmit its high-quality information to the listed company, it is more 
willing to hire an auditor with industry expertise. (Carcello & Nagy, 2004) found that the 
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industry expertise of accounting firms is related to financial manipulation behaviors, and 
industry special sessions can restrain clients' financial manipulation behaviors. 
(3) Audit fees 
Large accounting firms generally spend more time on auditing projects, and they also charge 
relatively high audit fees. Therefore, large accounting firms can often provide high-quality audit 
services, so they can use Audit fees are used as a substitute variable for audit quality (Palmrose, 
1986); moreover, (Francis & Stokes, 1986) studied the relationship between firm size and audit 
fees through the Simunic model, and found that the two are clearly positively correlated. From 
the perspective of the replacement of auditors, it is found that for companies with increased 
audit fees, the changes in audit fees and the company’s earnings management change in the 
same direction, that is, the more manipulable profits, the greater the increase in audit fees. 
2.4 Literature review resume 
Regarding the reform of auditing standards, the auditing academic community has conducted 
various studies on the disclosure of key audit matters, including the content, determination, 
expression and impact of key audit matters in multiple dimensions. Most studies believe that 
the disclosure of key audit matters can indeed bring about an increase in information content, 
and can promote investors to obtain effective information from audit reports, thereby having an 
impact on investors' decision-making. However, some scholars’ research results (Vanstraelen, 
Schelleman, Meuwissen, & Hofmann, 2012) believe that in order to maintain potential 
economic benefits, auditor will not transmit incremental information in key audit matters, and 
even if the actual key audit matters are disclosed in the audit report, the information maybe It 
is released to the market through other means, so there will be no market reaction. Therefore, 
the current conclusions regarding the market reaction to key audit matters are not clear. 
Regarding the aspects of audit reports that affect investors’ decision-making, research has 
shown that different types of audit opinions and audit reports with different content can bring 
different market reactions, and it also shows that the specific content of the audit report can 
indeed affect investors. Provide reference for decision-making. 
The audit quality is affected and restricted by many factors. However, the existing research on 
the impact of key audit matters disclosure on audit quality is less, most of the research on this 
is obtained in a simulated experimental environment, and the empirical research is also based 
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on the data of the UK market, which is difficult to draw a general conclusion. 
In summary, the current analysis of the effects of the disclosure of key audit matters is not clear. 
Therefore, this article analyzes the disclosure of key audit matters from two aspects. On the one 
hand, it conducts research on the market reaction after the disclosure of key audit matters, and 
examines whether the disclosure will bring about changes in stock prices on the capital market. 
On the other hand, analysis of key audit matters will lead to an improvement in audit quality.  
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III. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
3.1 Basic theories 
3.1.1 Information asymmetry theory 
The theory of information asymmetry has attracted the attention of many American economists 
in the 1870s. This theory provides a good perspective for the market economy. These 
economists conducted research from the perspectives of several markets such as commodities, 
labor, and finance. The specific concept of the information market is attributed to George Arthur 
Akerlof, who carefully studied the second-hand car market and wrote the famous work "The 
Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism". In his research, he found 
that: due to the asymmetry of news between buyers and sellers, the quality of the used car 
market is getting worse and worse, which ultimately makes the used car market difficult to 
survive. This is because the phenomenon of information asymmetry will always make the weak 
party of information lack of confidence, resulting in excessively high transaction costs. 
Therefore, the elements of the information asymmetry theory can be summarized into the 
following two points: one is the difference in the amount of information, the information held 
by both parties to the transaction is different, there is an advantage in information resources, or 
that one party is more difficult to obtain information than the other party Much lower. The 
second is that both parties are aware of this inequality in information. In real life, when a certain 
contract is established, the relationship formed by the asymmetric information of the two parties 
involved can be regarded as a principal-agent relationship. This situation is also common, such 
as commodity sales, insurance and underwriting, and the relationship between patients and 
physicians. Time can be considered to be formed under this condition. The basic assumption in 
economics is the rational person assumption, that is, everyone pursues the maximization of 
benefits under their own conditions. Therefore, when the two parties with asymmetric 
information face market risks, one party may use information advantages to conceal the relevant 
situation and make measures that are unfavorable to the other party, which causes two main 
parts in the theory of information asymmetry. One is Adverse selection can also be called 
unfavorable selection. It means that before the contract is entered into, the party conducting the 
market transaction already possesses certain information that the other party does not have, and 
the party that owns the information will make decisions that benefit itself based on this 
information. An act that harms the interests of the other party for the benefit of interest; the 
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other is called moral hazard, also called an act of ethics. After the contract is concluded, the 
information-superior party does not need to bear the price when it damages the interests of the 
other party. 
Similarly, in the capital market, information asymmetry is widespread. The shareholders and 
management of listed companies often have an absolute advantage in obtaining information 
about the company. In an unregulated environment, they can often not disclose or make 
selective disclosures to the market. Ways to seek their own personal gain. In an orderly and 
regulated environment, forcing companies to disclose their own situation to the public and 
investors is to reduce this asymmetry of information, to protect small and medium investors lies 
in the disadvantages of information access, and to improve access to information by small and 
medium investors Ability. For auditors, in some respects, their job is to protect the true surname 
and adequacy of the disclosure of listed companies, effectively reducing the asymmetry of this 
information. On the one hand, disclosing key audit matters will enable auditors to do more audit 
work. In this process, it will reduce the information asymmetry between auditors and listed 
companies, thereby providing protection for the effective disclosure of audit reports. On the 
other hand, by adding key audit matters to the audit report, investors can read these contents to 
enable investors to have a better understanding of the actual situation of the company, and also 
to learn more about the audit performed by the auditors, reducing investment the information 
gap between the auditor and the auditor and the listed company reduces the existing information 
asymmetry. 
3.1.2 Signaling theory 
The Signaling theory originated from the research conducted by Michael Spence in 1974. He 
was the first to discover education level as a signal, which was transmitted between job seekers 
and recruiters. Through the analysis of individuals with information advantages in the market, 
the information is transmitted to the individuals who are weak in information, and job applicants 
with different production capacities are distinguished and identified, thereby effectively 
reducing communication costs and realizing a highly efficient market equilibrium. Based on 
this research, he opened up the research field of signal transmission, and this model of labor 
market has become a classic style in the field of Signaling theory. Since then, Spence has 
continued to expand research in this area and carried out a large number of applied researches 
confirming different market signals. Finally, he summarized the concept of Signaling theory as: 
commodity information can be transmitted from one party to another through the market as a 
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medium. Based on the received signals, these receivers will make their own value judgments, 
and thus make the decision whether to trade. Therefore, signal transmission can play a role in 
reducing information asymmetry, prompting information receivers to make reasonable 
decisions, and ensuring market stability and order. 
According to the idea of Signaling theory, the theory has two applications in this article. One is 
the signal transmission involved in the audit report, and the other is the transmission of the 
auditor's personal reputation. Listed companies are origins of information, and they pass various 
company information to investors through audit reports. According to the various information 
in the audit report, the investors perceive the auditor’s understanding of the company’s situation, 
make a judgment on the value of company, and reduce the information gap between the investor 
and the auditor, and make investment or non-investment decisions. In such process, as reducing 
of information cost and decision-making cost, the market efficiency will be improved. From 
another aspect, after the audit report with the name of the auditor and the accounting firm to 
which it belongs is issued, the reputation of the auditor and the accounting firm will also be 
used as a signal to investors. As the accountant market is becoming more and more saturated 
and competition is becoming increasingly fierce, the personal reputation of auditors is 
becoming more and more important. Because once an audit fails or there is an issue of 
independence in the audit, this negative signal will be transmitted quickly, and it is easy to cause 
a strong public reaction. Therefore, this has prompted reputable auditors and accounting firms 
to pay more attention to maintaining their own reputations, deliver a positive reaction to the 
market, and reduce the risks of audit failures and bad reputation information. 
3.1.3 Reputation management theory 
In reputation management theory, reputation is considered to be the high evaluation of 
individuals or groups associated with the actor based on the actor’s past behavior, and its 
essence can enable the actor to obtain long-term benefits. 
The main reason for reputation is the asymmetry of information between the parties to the 
transaction. In fact, in the 18th century, the famous economist Adam Smith studied the 
important role of reputation in the proper performance of economic contracts. According to the 
view of reputation theory, reputation is a collection of some information, including the historical 
behavior and characteristics of the information subject. This information is continuously 
disseminated and updated in the market, forming a more stable recognition in the minds of 
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market participants. know. All parties in the market use these corporate information resources 
to obtain the counterparty's information in advance during transactions, thereby reducing 
cognitive links, effectively saving transaction resources and reducing transaction costs. 
According to reputation theory, reputation constitutes the assets of the transaction subject, 
which will bring definite economic inflows to the company, but the maintenance of reputation 
also requires the company to invest resources, so the value of reputation can be subtracted from 
the long-term benefits brought by good reputation the cost of maintaining reputation is 
calculated. According to this principle, entities with good reputations are more likely to build 
reputations, because these companies already have a reputation. Maintaining a good reputation 
can bring them a steady stream of long-term benefits, making them willing to invest sufficient 
costs. However, if a body with a good reputation has breached the contract or produced 
unqualified products, the impact on the company will also be very huge, and it may even lead 
to the bankruptcy of the company in severe cases. In the secondary market, consumers care 
most about product quality. Before the purchase occurs, they cannot recognize the actual quality 
of the product, but they can feel the overall evaluation of the product from the broad market 
and form their own Psychological expectations. If the final purchase of goods far exceeds their 
own psychological expectations, it will have a great impact on consumers’ psychology and form 
a certain degree of trust in the company. The part that exceeds expectations will also form the 
company’s reputation value. Future decision-making plays a huge role, and can bring this 
influence to people around, thus bringing benefits to the enterprise. 
The audit service provided by auditors is a special commodity, and the evaluation criteria for it 
are not uniform and fixed. Therefore, it is difficult for audit clients and investors to make 
judgments about different audit services. In this case, the reputation of auditors has become an 
important indicator and an effective incentive and restraint mechanism for auditors. If the 
professional competence and independence of the CPA are relatively strong, the high-quality 
auditing services it provides will be generally recognized by investors in the customer's market 
throughout the years, and gradually form its own reputation. On the one hand, this recognition 
means higher audit quality, which can effectively restrain the management's accrued earnings 
management behavior and reduce the risk of fraud in corporate financial reports. Therefore, 
investors can make their own investments based on the contents of the audit report. decision 
making. On the other hand, in order to make the truthful statements in financial reports 
recognized by the market, listed companies select accounting firms and auditors with better 
reputations to provide services for themselves, and accounting firms must also obtain long-term 
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benefits. In addition, the establishment of reputation requires a long period of high audit service 
level as the basis, but reputation loss is also very easy. Once the time of failure of the audit 
occurs, the reputation of the industry that has been painstakingly operated for a long time can 
be completely destroyed, and it may even be subject to legal litigation and compensation. 
Moreover, auditors and accounting firms that have failed audits will also receive continuous 
attention from the market. Regardless of the cause of the audit failures, auditors and accounting 
firms are considered to lack professional competence and professional rationale. Their future 
professional activities have brought great obstacles. Therefore, under the role of reputation 
theory, auditors with good reputation will pay more attention to their own reputation, and thus 
care more about the quality of their audit services. 
3.1.4 The efficient market hypothesis 
The "efficient market hypothesis" originated in 1900. The founder of this hypothesis was a 
Frenchman named Louis Bachelier. When the French mathematician conducted research, he 
found that commodity prices follow a random walk. It is effective. Therefore, he used 
mathematical statistical analysis to study the stocks on the market and found that the 
mathematical expectation of stock returns is constant at zero. In 1970, Eugene Fama conducted 
in-depth research on this field and finally put forward the theory of the efficient market 
hypothesis. He believes that in a fully efficient market, all investment participants in the market 
can obtain a large amount of information at low cost, and the price of the stock market can fully 
reflect all information. It is impossible for investors in the market to obtain abnormal returns 
by obtaining information. According to the degree of information asymmetry, the efficient 
market theory is divided into three levels: one is a strong efficient market, at which all 
information is immediately reflected in the market price of stocks, and the other is a semi-strong 
efficient market. The publicly disclosed company-related information is reflected in the stock 
price, and it is not valid to rely on the analysis of public information to obtain income. The third 
is a weak effective market, where prices only reflect historical information. 
According to the research conclusions of (Borges, 2010), the Spanish stock market doesn’t 
reject the efficient market hypothesis and is most efficient in whole Europe. It can be considered 
that public information of companies can be reflected in stock prices. Therefore, if the 
disclosure of key audit information in public audit reports can be considered as an important 
investment information, it brings stock price fluctuations. Therefore, the company that discloses 
key audit information may cause changes in stock prices during the window period, resulting 
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in abnormal returns. Therefore, the research on market reaction in this article can be established. 
3.2 Research hypothesis 
According to the provisions of the audit standards, key audit matters are selected from matters 
communicated with management. Therefore, the management's willingness to communicate on 
key audit matters affects the auditor's access to disclosed information. (Tysiac, 2014) believes 
that important accounting estimates and other aspects may be disclosed in the new audit report, 
and this information is likely to arouse investors' negative sentiment towards the company, 
which will adversely affect the company. Therefore, the management actively communicates 
with the auditors to enable the auditors to better understand the disclosed matters and minimize 
the adverse effects of the disclosed content. Therefore, the disclosure of key audit matters can 
also be regarded as a signal that the management and the auditors have communicated well, 
reducing investors' uncertainty about the company. 
In terms of disclosure content, the unreformed audit report only has differences in audit opinions 
between different reports, and most of the other content is templated, so report readers cannot 
obtain the company’s existing risk items and audits in the report. What specific audit procedures 
did the auditor do during the audit process (Humphrey, Loft, & Woods, 2009) So theoretically 
speaking, the disclosure of key audit matters can increase report readers' understanding of 
relevant details and improve the information content of the audit report. In terms of specific 
content, the key audit item section can be divided into "item description section" and "audit 
response section". The item description section describes the company's business model and 
operating conditions, so that investors can get a good understanding of the basic situation of the 
listed company (Bens, Chang, & Huang, 2019). The audit response section enables readers to 
understand the audit procedures performed by the auditors, and also enables readers to realize 
that the auditors have communicated with management and governance in terms of risk 
response, thereby reducing investors’ exposure to company risks. Estimate and judge. 
In summary, we believe that the disclosure of key audit matters can provide statement users 
with more information, have an impact on investors' decision-making, and cause certain market 
reactions. 
Based on the above analysis, hypothesis 1 is proposed: the disclosure of key audit matters 
can bring about positive market reactions. 
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The new standard requires the disclosure of key audit matters, and in the process of disclosure, 
in order to ensure the authenticity and objectivity of the disclosed information and reduce audit 
risks, auditors will therefore consider more carefully whether they maintain an objective and 
fair attitude during the audit process. Use professional skepticism to conduct audit work, 
carefully treat the problems found in the audit process, adopt a more active work attitude to 
implement the audit plan, obtain more sufficient audit evidence, and complete the audit work. 
At the same time, it will also communicate more fully with the management and governance of 
the audited unit regarding the disclosed matters. In these processes, the probability of auditors 
being able to find errors or fraudulent behaviors of the audited unit is increased, thereby 
effectively improving the quality of audits. 
Secondly, from the perspective of governance, because there is more communication with 
auditors, the governance can also detect management’s speculation in accounting policies early, 
and effectively suppress management’s earnings management through timely communication 
with management. Behavior, thereby improving audit quality. 
Finally, from the management's own perspective, in the face of the supervision of the 
governance and the auditor's repeated acquisition of audit evidence and the disclosure to the 
public of matters that were originally only reflected in the auditor's papers, the management 
will also face these pressures. Adopt more robust accounting policies to ensure reasonable 
disclosure of key audit matters. Therefore, the behavior of management will also lead to an 
improvement in audit quality. 
Based on the above analysis, hypothesis 2 is proposed: The disclosure of key audit matters 
will improve the audit quality.  
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IV. RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Measurement of market reaction and audit quality 
4.1.1 Market reaction 
The event study method is used to figure out the market reaction, and the cumulative abnormal 
return calculated by the market model is used as the proxy variable of the market reaction. The 
specific method is as follows: 
First, it is necessary to determine the event day, event window and estimated window period. 
This article will include the first publication day of the audit report containing key audit matters 
as the 0th day of the event day; use [-5, +5] as the event window period. The estimated window 
is selected from 210 days before the event to the 11th day before the event, a total of 200 days. 
For the cumulative abnormal return, divided into the following steps computing. First calculate 
the expected return, the calculation method is: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡
′ = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑅𝑚𝑡 (1) 
In this formula, Rit refers to the actual return of the i-th stock on the t-th day during the window 
period. The calculation method is: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = (𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖(𝑡−1)) 𝑃𝑖(𝑡−1)⁄ (2) 
Pit represents the closing price of the i-th stock on day t, and Pi(t-1) represents the closing price 
of the i-th stock on day t-l. Rmt represents the return of the corresponding market portfolio in 
the market IBEX-35 on day t. 𝛼 and 𝛽 are the independent and dependent variables of Rit 
and Rmt for each day, calculated by the least square method with 𝛼 and 𝛽 in R = 𝛼 + 𝛽Rmt, 
using the real number pairs of Rit and Rmt in the window period. 
The calculation method of the abnormal return of a single stock is: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑖𝑡
′ (3) 
The cumulative abnormal return of stock i in the event period: 
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4.1.2 Audit quality 
The detecting of earnings management is a widely used method to measure audit quality. Based 
on this approach, the well-known Modified Jones Model by (Jones, 1991)) and (Dechow, Sloan, 
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Firstly, using this equation to get the estimates of coefficients, and then the expected NDA can 
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𝑃𝑃𝐸𝜏
𝐴𝜏−1
) + 𝜀𝜏 (6) 
𝐷𝐴 = TA − NDA (7) 
TA represents total accruals, NDA represents non-discretionary accruals, DA represents 
discretionary accruals, A represents total Assets, ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉 represents variance of revenue, ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶 
represents variance of receivables, 𝑃𝑃𝐸 represents fixed asset, 𝜀𝜏represents error term. 
4.2 Sample selection and data sources 
4.2.1 Sample selection 
The sample companies selected in this article are the 35 companies included in the IBEX-35 
index list of 2019. Excluding 7 financial, bank and insurance industries (Banco Sabadell, Banco 
Santander, Bankia, Bankinter, BBVA, CaixaBank, Mapfre), in which those companies have 
different financial structures and distinct methodologies to measure their financial states 
comparing with other industries, so it is important to avoid the influence of these peculiarities 
on the analysis results. In addition, ArcelorMittal (MTS) was removed from the sample list 
because it became a Luxembourg-based company after the acquisition of the former Arcelor 
and was not included in the SABI database. There are 27 available samples. Each sample 
company selects the data of the first two years and the next two years of applying the ISA-701 
standard, a total of 4 fiscal years. A total of 108 sets of data. 
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In the process of data collection, there are several key points that need to be specifically pointed 
out: 
1. Except for Inditex SA, the financial year of the other 26 companies is from January 1 to 
December 31 of each calendar year. Therefore, according to the above data selection 
criteria, the data for 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 are included. The financial year of 
Inditex SA is from February 1st to January 31st of the following year. In order to unify 
the data and facility following data analysis, I remark especially the financial year of 
Inditex SA that the data from February 1st of 2015 to January 31st of 2016 as financial 
year 2015, so as 2016, 2017, and 2018. 
2. Gamesa Corporación Tecnológica S.A. merged with Siemens Wind Power in July 2016, 
and the new combined company changed its fiscal year end date to September 30 of 
each year. Accordingly, we can observe that the company published two annual reports 
in February and November 2017. For the sake of data harmonization, the period from 
January 1, 2017 to September 30, 2017 is treated as fiscal year 2017, while the period 
from October 1, 2017 to September 30, 2018 is treated as fiscal year 2018.  
4.2.2 Data sources 
The information of audit reports of the sample companies is subject to the version published on 
the CNMV website. It should be pointed out that ArcelorMittal’s annual report is not disclosed 
in CNMV, so the annual report disclosed on its company’s official website shall prevail. 
The company's financial data is subject to the data in the SABI database.  
The company's stock price data is based on Dow Jones' Factiva database. 
4.3 Variable selection and definition 
When verifying hypothesis 1, the explanatory variable is whether to disclose key audit matters, 
and the explained variable is the cumulative abnormal return. When verifying Hypothesis 2, the 
explanatory variable is whether to disclose key audit matters, and the explained variable is the 
discretionary accruals. 
In terms of control variables, this article combines the research of previous scholars and selects 
the following 5 control variables: 
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(1) Company size (SIZE): The total assets of a listed company represent the company's size, 
expressed in logarithm. Generally speaking, the larger the scale of the company's assets, the 
more stable the company's stock price, and it is difficult to be manipulated by a few investors. 
At the same time, companies with large assets often have a sound governance structure and an 
effective internal control system, which can effectively restrain the management's profit 
manipulation behavior, and often have relatively high audit quality. 
(2) Asset-liability ratio (LEV): The ratio of total liabilities of listed companies to total assets 
can represent financial risks. Companies with a high debt-to-asset ratio indicate that debt 
financing accounts for a relatively large proportion and therefore have relatively large financial 
risks. Investors are considering risk control and generally will not invest in such companies, so 
they have excessive assets and liabilities. The rate may bring negative changes in stock prices. 
In addition, for companies with higher debt-to-asset ratios, the company's management has 
more incentives to whitewash the financial statements, which may result in lower audit quality. 
(3) Net asset interest rate (ROA): It is the net profit at the end of the period/total equity at the 
end of the period. A company with high earnings per share indicates that it can use fewer 
resources to create stronger profits. Companies with high net asset interest rates will be 
considered by investors to have stronger profitability and higher enthusiasm for investment in 
such companies; if the company has stronger profitability, the need for earnings management 
will decrease. On the contrary, if the company's profitability is worse and there is greater 
pressure to continue operating, the company's management is very motivated to disguise the 
company's financial and operating conditions by manipulating earnings. 
(4) Growth rate of operating income (GROWTH): Reflects the growth of the company. The 
calculation method is (operating income of the current year-operating income of the previous 
year)/operating income of the previous year. Companies with high operating income growth 
rates generally are in a period of rising business and has future profit expectations, so they are 
easily recognized by investors; Meanwhile, higher operating income growth rates represents 
the company's ability to continue operations. Generally speaking, a company with a stronger 
ability to continue operations has less incentive to manipulate earnings. 
(5) Loss: Determined by the company’s net profit. A company that has incurred losses may be 
considered by investors as a manifestation of inadequate ability to continue operations, which 
may easily cause investors to sell their stocks. In addition, the loss-making company has the 
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motivation to cover up the true situation of the company through earnings management. 
Therefore, use "whether to make a loss" as the control variable for the study. 
Type Name Code Meaning 
Explanatory variables 
Disclosure of key 
audit matters 
KAM 
Disclosure as "1"; 
undisclosed as "0" 
Explained variable 
Market Reaction CAR As 4.1  
Audit quality DA As 4.2 
Control variable 
Company size SIZE 
Natural logarithm of total 
assets 
Asset-liability ratio LEV Total liabilities/total assets 
Net asset interest rate ROA 
Net profit/average total 
assets 
Growth rate GROWTH 
Operating income growth / 
operating income of the 
previous period 
Loss LOSS 
Net profit is less than 0, as 
"1", otherwise as "0" 
4.4 Model construction 
In order to verify Hypothesis 1, a multiple linear regression model is established to examine 
whether key audit matters can bring incremental information to investors, thereby bringing 
positive market reactions. In the model, the explanatory variable is the cumulative abnormal 
return, and the explanatory variable is the key audit matter disclosed in the audit report: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 =  𝜕1 + 𝜕2𝐾𝐴𝑀 + 𝜕3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝜕4𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝜕5𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝜕6𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 + 𝜕7𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝜀 (8) 
In order to verify the second hypothesis, a multiple linear regression model is established to 
examine whether the key audit items can improve the audit quality. In the model, the 
explanatory variable is non-discretionary accruals, whether the key audit matters are disclosed 
in the audit report of the explanatory variable, 




V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
5.1 Data Preparation 
5.1.1 Cumulative Abnormal Return 
The raw data obtained from the Factiva database contains, daily opening price, closing price, 
high price, low price, and volume information for 27 companies' stocks as well as the IBEX35 
index from May 1, 2015 to May 1, 2019. The daily real returns were obtained by using Equation 
(2). 
Based on Equation (1), the daily returns for each company for each year of the window period 
were fitted to the market returns for that day in a one-dimensional linear regression to obtain 
the respective expected return coefficients. 
Afterwards, the corresponding expected return is calculated based on the market return and 
expected return coefficients for the event period of each company's annual audit report release, 
and the abnormal return is obtained according to Equation (3). 
Finally, the abnormal returns for the event period are summed according to Equation (4) to 
obtain the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for each company for each year. 
5.1.2 Discretionary Accruals 
A multivariate linear fit was performed based on the data obtained from the SABI database 
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The results of the fit are shown in Table 5-2 below: 
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Table 5-2 Result of OLS with Modified Jones Model 
Dependent variable: Y 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const −0.0338364 0.0390879 −0.8656 0.3887  
X1 −149.846 18065.0 −0.008295 0.9934  
X2 0.664606 0.0905669 7.338 <0.0001 *** 
X3 0.167027 0.0301758 5.535 <0.0001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  0.153912  S.D. dependent var  0.330548 
Sum squared resid  5.749096  S.E. of regression  0.235117 
R-squared  0.508246  Adjusted R-squared  0.494061 
F(3, 104)  35.82934  P-value(F)  5.51e-16 
Log-likelihood  5.141422  Akaike criterion −2.282844 
Schwarz criterion  8.445681  Hannan-Quinn  2.067183 
The non-discretionary accruals of each company per year is then calculated using Equation 6, 
and finally the discretionary accruals of each company per year is calculated using Equation 7, 
and its absolute value is taken as the final DA data. 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
First, descriptive statistics were conducted for 27 companies for 4 years, as shown in Table 5-3 
below: 
Table 5-3 Descriptive statistics of all variables 
Variable Mean Median S.D. Min Max 
CAR -0.00253 -0.00444 0.0524 -0.173 0.160 
DA 0.158 0.112 0.163 0.000159 0.843 
KAM 0.500 0.500 0.502 0.000 1.00 
SIZE 15.4 15.5 1.41 11.9 18.3 
LEV 50.0 53.2 22.5 5.00 88.4 
ROA 5.45 3.06 11.6 -42.4 68.8 
GROWTH 1.16 0.0534 8.73 -0.802 89.6 
LOSS 0.139 0.000 0.347 0.000 1.00 
From the above table, the direct cumulative abnormal return varies widely from year to year for 
different companies, with a maximum of 0.1603, a minimum of -0.1729, and a mean of -
0.002534, which approximates to 0. The difference in actionable accrued profit is also relatively 
large, with a maximum of 0.8434, a minimum of 0.0001592, and a mean of 0.1581. 
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5.3 Correlation test 
Before regression analysis of the model, in order to avoid the existence of multicollinearity of 
the variables involved in the above, the correlation analysis of the variables studied in the model 
was first performed, and the figures in the Table 4 are the Pearson coefficients between the 
variables. 
The individual numbers in the table indicate the direct relationship and closeness and direction 
of the two variables, the greater the absolute value of this number, the higher the correlation 
between the two, and its positive and negative represent the direction. Overall, each coefficient 
in the above table does not exceed 0.6, which indicates that the design of the model is basically 
reasonable and there is no problem of multicollinearity that affects the results. 
In order to show the correlation between each variable more intuitively, the following is its 
correlation matrix: 
Graph 1 correlation matrix of all variables 
Correlation matrix
0.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 1.0
-0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.2 -0.0 1.0 -0.1
-0.2 0.1 -0.0 0.1 -0.2 1.0 -0.0 -0.5
0.0 -0.0 0.1 0.1 1.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.0
0.1 0.2 0.1 1.0 0.1 0.1 -0.0 -0.3
0.0 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0
0.1 1.0 0.0 0.2 -0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.0










































CAR DA KAM SIZE LEV ROA GROWTH LOSS  
1.0000 0.1173 0.0099 0.0726 0.0222 -0.1623 -0.0543 0.1491 CAR 
 1.0000 0.0486 0.1501 -0.0326 0.0956 0.1006 -0.0047 DA 
  1.0000 0.0809 0.0608 -0.0472 -0.0881 -0.0268 KAM 
   1.0000 0.0963 0.1475 -0.0171 -0.3265 SIZE 
    1.0000 -0.2251 -0.1765 0.0324 LEV 
     1.0000 -0.0207 -0.5221 ROA 
      1.0000 -0.0612 GROWTH 
       1.0000 LOSS 
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5.4 Multiple linear regression results 
5.4.1 multiple linear regression with model 1 
In order to test hypothesis 1, which is whether the disclosure of key audit matters in the annual 
reports of all companies would lead to a positive market reaction, a multiple linear regression 
was conducted with the annual reports of companies in the IBEX35 index as samples, following 
model 1, and the results are presented in the table 5. 
Table 5 Result of multiple linear regression with model 1 
Dependent variable: CAR 
 
Mean dependent var −0.002534  S.D. dependent var  0.052439 
Sum squared resid  0.279250  S.E. of regression  0.052582 
R-squared  0.050928  Adjusted R-squared -0.005453 
F(6, 101)  0.903284  P-value(F)  0.495745 
Log-likelihood  168.4748  Akaike criterion −322.9495 
Schwarz criterion −304.1746  Hannan-Quinn −315.3370 
From the regression results, the R-squared is 0.05 and P-value is 0.495745 which is smaller 
than F(6,101), failed to pass the F-test, so according to this model we cannot accept the 
hypothesis 1, that is, we cannot judge that the disclosure of key audit matters from 2017 will 
come to bring a positive market reaction. 
Analyzing from each parameter, where the coefficient of KAM is -0.000662605 and the p-value 
is 0.9484, the result is not significant. The other coefficients such as firm size (SIZE), capital 
profitability (ROA), and loss of profits (LOSS) show relatively high correlations with the 
cumulative abnormal returns.  
 Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const −0.0747937 0.0604864 −1.237 0.2191  
KAM −0.000662605 0.0102231 −0.06481 0.9484  
SIZE 0.00500991 0.00384880 1.302 0.1960  
LEV −7.48157e-05 0.000239285 −0.3127 0.7552  
ROA −0.000565349 0.000532665 −1.061 0.2911  
GROWTH −0.000319382 0.000598685 −0.5335 0.5949  
LOSS 0.0188973 0.0181172 1.043 0.2994  
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5.4.2 multiple linear regression with model 2 
In order to test hypothesis 2, which is whether the disclosure of key audit matters will improve 
the audit quality, a multiple linear regression was conducted with the annual reports of 
companies in the IBEX35 index as samples, following model 2, and the results are presented in 
the table 6. 
Table 6 Result of multiple linear regression with model 2 
Dependent variable: DA 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const −0.176773 0.187777 −0.9414 0.3487  
KAM 0.0181912 0.0317372 0.5732 0.5678  
SIZE 0.0197540 0.0119484 1.653 0.1014  
LEV −2.17996e-05 0.000742850 −0.02935 0.9766  
ROA 0.00204522 0.00165363 1.237 0.2190  
GROWTH 0.00222812 0.00185859 1.199 0.2334  
LOSS 0.0639097 0.0562441 1.136 0.2585  
 
Mean dependent var  0.158092  S.D. dependent var  0.163040 
Sum squared resid  2.691304  S.E. of regression  0.163238 
R-squared  0.053778  Adjusted R-squared -0.002433 
F(6, 101)  0.956713  P-value(F)  0.458513 
Log-likelihood  46.12834  Akaike criterion −78.25668 
Schwarz criterion −59.48176  Hannan-Quinn −70.64413 
The regression results for model 2 exhibit similar results to model 1, with a lower R-squared 
value (0.053778) demonstrating a lower correlation that does not pass the F-test, among others. 
This also brings similar consequences, i.e., the inability to accept hypothesis 2, thus we cannot 
judge that the disclosure of key audit matters from 2017 will come to improve the audit quality. 
5.5 Analysis of the results 
The ISA 701 standard issued by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(IAASB) is to improve the information content of audit reports, so that investors can obtain 
more effective content from them, so that investors have more confidence in the investment 
target, thereby promoting the prosperity and stable development of the capital market. 
However, judging from the research results of this article, the disclosure of key audit matters 
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has not achieved the expected results. The possible reasons are: 
1. Among the factors that affect the company's stock price, the opinions and decisions of 
institutional investors are very important. They themselves have a wealth of information 
sources, as well as strong financial report analysis and data mining capabilities. Therefore, the 
content covered in the key audit matters is not obvious for the information supplement of 
institutional investors, and cannot significantly improve their information acquisition 
capabilities, thereby enhancing their confidence in the investment target. 
2. The disclosure of key audit matters does provide independent investors with a way to obtain 
more investment information. However, reading and understanding key audit matters still 
places high requirements on the financial literacy of independent investors, which is probably 
what they lack. Therefore, the effect of making up for the information gap between independent 
investors and investment targets by disclosing key audit markets may be very limited. 
3. The release of key audit matters has not changed the habits of investors in a short period of 
time. Investors tend to ignore the contents of the audit report for the financial report that the 
audit institution has issued an unqualified opinion report. The monotony and uniformity of audit 
reports for a long time, especially when unqualified opinions are issued, has made investors not 
have the habit of carefully reading audit reports. Therefore, in the short term when the new 
standard is issued, such as the first and second years of the sample in this article, the disclosure 
of key audit matters in the audit report may not have attracted enough attention from investors. 
Therefore, the market reaction affected by this is not obvious. 
In addition, the issuance of new standards that require the disclosure of key audit matters puts 
forward new requirements for audit companies, and has more conditions for evaluating audit 
quality. The disclosure of key audit matters requires auditors to publish the contents of the audit 
working paper, which poses new challenges to the rigor and professionalism of the audit work. 
However, judging from the statistical research results of this article, the disclosure of key audit 
matters does not have a significant effect on the improvement of audit quality. This may be 
caused by the following points: 
1. The disclosure of key audit matters has not brought about a substantial revolution in audit 
tasks, and the working methods and corresponding requirements of auditors are still succumbed 
to other existing auditing standards. The key audit matters disclosed originally exist in the audit 
working paper, which surprises the auditors may not even need to do additional work to meet 
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the requirements of the new standards. 
2. For top audit firms, the requirements for audit quality are not only compliance with 
international auditing standards, but also strict internal systems. The top audit firms have raised 
the assurance of audit quality to a very high level in all aspects of talent selection, training and 
management. Therefore, only the requirement of disclosing key audit matters cannot 
revolutionize the current audit quality. 
3. Although ISA-701 puts forward a series of requirements and standards for the disclosure of 
key audit matters, there is still a lack of strict and detailed standards. As the main body of audit 
work, auditors still have room for subjective opinions on the number, specific aspects and 
expressions of key audit matters disclosed. This makes the disclosure of key audit matters to 
improve audit quality to a large extent depend on the professionalism of the auditors themselves. 
4. Similar to investors, in the first two years when the auditing standards required the disclosure 
of key audit matters, the auditor’s understanding of the role of key audit matters in improving 
audit quality is likely to be still in the exploratory stage, and possibly can’t effectively disclose 






6.1 Research conclusions 
The following conclusions are drawn from this paper's study of the impact of requiring the 
disclosure of key audit matters in audit reports since 2017, within the context of IBEX-35 
companies. 
First, comparing market data for a total of four years before and after the issuance of the 
requirement to disclose key audit matters, the disclosure of key audit matters did not result in a 
positive or negative market reaction at the statistical level. 
Second, comparing the market data for the four years before and after the issuance of the 
requirement to disclose key audit matters, the disclosure of key audit matters did not have a 
statistically significant effect on the improvement of audit quality. 
6.2 Limitations and Research prospects 
Finally, it must be pointed out that due to the availability of data, the limitations of data analysis 
capabilities, and some deficiencies in the overall research design, the conclusions of this 
empirical analysis have some limitations. 
1. The number of samples. In this study, the audit reports of non-bank insurance financial 
companies in IBEX 35 were used as samples. Although the sampling year was extended to two 
years before and after, the number of samples was still very limited compared to the multiple 
linear regression analysis model used.  
2. Sample selection. IBEX 35 selects high-quality, representative, and important companies in 
the Spanish national economy as components of its index. 
First of all, these companies are in good operating conditions, with high internal management 
quality, and the management's motivation and operability for earnings management are very 
low. However, this article uses earnings management as a proxy variable of audit quality, which 
will make it less significant compared to other companies. 
Secondly, most of these companies have maintained a long-term good social reputation, and 
their operations continue to be subject to media reports and authority supervision, which makes 
35 
 
investors less concerned about their audit reports, which will weaken the market reaction 
brought about by the new contents of the audit reports to a certain extent. 
3. Selection of variables. This article takes discretionary accruals in earnings management as a 
proxy variable for audit quality. Although many relevant researches use such approach, it does 
not fully reflect the true characteristics of audit quality. It simply measures the possibility of 
financial manipulation by the management of the audited unit, but ignores the decisive 
significance of the auditor's work in audit quality. 
In further research, the scope of the sample can be expanded, especially to include small and 
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Anexo 1 List of sample companies: 
 code name 
1 ACCIONA, SA 
2 ACERINOX, SA 
3 ACS, ACTIVIDADES DE CONSTRUCCION Y SERVICIOS, SA 
4 AENA S.M.E. SA. 
5 ALMIRALL SA 
6 AMADEUS IT GROUP SA 
7 CELLNEX TELECOM SA. 
8 CIE AUTOMOTIVE, SA 
9 ENAGAS SA 
10 ENDESA SA 
11 FERROVIAL SA 
12 GRIFOLS SA 
13 IBERDROLA, SOCIEDAD ANONIMA 
14 INDRA SISTEMAS, SOCIEDAD ANONIMA 
15 INDUSTRIA DE DISEÑO TEXTIL SA 
16 INMOBILIARIA COLONIAL SOCIMI S.A. 
17 INTERNATIONAL CONSOLIDATED AIRLINES GROUP SA 
18 MELIA HOTELS INTERNATIONAL SA. 
19 MERLIN PROPERTIES SOCIMI SA. 
20 NATURGY ENERGY GROUP SA. 
21 PHARMA MAR SA 
22 RED ELECTRICA CORPORACION SA 
23 REPSOL SA. 
24 SIEMENS GAMESA RENEWABLE ENERGY SOCIEDAD ANONIMA 
25 SOLARIA ENERGIA Y MEDIO AMBIENTE, SA 
26 TELEFONICA, SA 




Anexo 2 List of multiple linear regression database 
NAME CAR DA KAM SIZE LEV ROA GROWTH LOSS 
ANA-2015 -0.0412 0.012934 0 15.47612 40.249 3.359 
-
0.242873436 0 
ANA-2016 -0.00919 0.177603 0 15.57137 36.814 6.743 
-
0.493542192 0 
ANA-2017 0.009402 0.143677 1 15.60521 38.883 2.834 
-
0.073835942 0 
ANA-2018 0.065909 0.159463 1 15.70691 46.15 2.969 1.488539376 0 
ACX-2015 -0.05317 0.071798 0 14.83923 75.52 -0.829 0.048344685 1 
ACX-2016 -0.02491 0.087223 0 14.8079 75.48 0.015 0.046987708 0 
ACX-2017 0.043789 0.089181 1 14.79689 79.459 0.48 0.059699716 0 
ACX-2018 -0.02437 0.030812 1 14.72946 88.378 -5.041 0.049849049 1 
ACS-2015 -0.0126 0.064186 0 15.82976 70.114 1.739 
-
0.248320251 0 
ACS-2016 0.03023 0.139937 0 15.76623 64.786 18.089 2.033555303 0 
ACS-2017 -0.02729 0.027383 1 15.68097 56.603 10.044 
-
0.649357161 0 
ACS-2018 -0.00452 0.224047 1 15.84392 53.864 13.915 
-
0.170657832 0 
AENA-2015 0.027846 0.023104 0 16.60706 71.271 6.322 0.069636134 0 
AENA-2016 0.04526 0.023612 0 16.51334 63.875 10.132 0.080910358 0 
AENA-2017 -0.04069 0.012925 1 16.49678 58.769 10.916 0.070895483 0 
AENA-2018 -0.04069 0.009247 1 16.4626 55.173 12.111 0.055744208 0 
ALM-2015 -0.05292 0.255172 0 14.71242 42.694 4.001 
-
0.556421537 0 
ALM-2016 0.052604 0.058691 0 14.73087 43.11 2.445 
-
0.020621389 0 
ALM-2017 0.028786 0.189908 1 14.58036 45.69 -8.171 
-
0.033467649 1 
ALM-2018 -0.08993 0.059105 1 14.71881 51.118 2.808 0.075908388 0 
AMS-2015 0.012361 0.002487 0 14.19145 73.859 24.004 0.091328894 0 
AMS-2016 0.026219 0.09901 0 15.54486 74.108 14.908 8.871816214 0 
AMS-2017 0.000919 0.467482 1 15.54786 79.472 11.954 0.084493217 0 
AMS-2018 -0.07836 0.492822 1 15.72897 82.321 11.165 0.049155217 0 
CLNX-2015 0.063322 0.211341 0 14.34609 73.203 0.72 0.219091519 0 
CLNX-2016 0.025434 0.169052 0 14.74566 81.824 0.636 0.53176646 0 
CLNX-2017 -0.02068 0.137087 1 14.98974 85.727 -0.056 0.053413529 0 
CLNX-2018 -0.12521 0.102652 1 15.1118 84.77 -1.53 
-
0.096833814 1 
CIE-2015 0.053447 0.11373 0 14.0824 62.959 7.658 0.154688058 0 
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CIE-2016 -0.04488 0.136691 0 14.32074 67.463 4.09 0.086666292 0 
CIE-2017 -0.06305 0.108345 1 14.3452 67.439 4.969 0.196762894 0 
CIE-2018 -0.0197 0.241058 1 14.3378 75.968 2.495 
-
0.249848607 0 
ENG-2015 -0.04044 0.088561 0 15.62378 65.853 5.604 
-
0.040324656 0 
ENG-2016 0.031598 0.061351 0 15.53224 62.293 5.957 
-
0.039251337 0 
ENG-2017 0.050432 0.071573 1 15.45047 58.783 6.557 
-
0.012712213 0 
ENG-2018 -0.00954 0.114083 1 15.62089 64.921 5.901 
-
0.024518413 0 
ELE-2015 0.008836 0.195434 0 16.55137 48.408 6.723 
-
0.802266556 0 
ELE-2016 0.000576 0.111701 0 16.54851 48.234 8.693 0.097313433 0 
ELE-2017 0.057634 0.106946 1 16.54988 47.766 9.655 
-
0.031556039 0 
ELE-2018 -0.00054 0.15561 1 16.85224 61.17 7.011 0.110674157 0 
FER-2015 -0.07036 0.118837 0 16.20809 50.668 0.587 0.181134005 0 
FER-2016 0.033377 0.102433 0 16.12724 51.729 0.763 0.084152037 0 
FER-2017 -0.01372 0.096854 1 15.98102 48.984 0.974 
-
0.336143504 0 
FER-2018 0.031811 0.112738 1 15.97214 53.853 0.555 
-
0.027972028 0 
GRF-2015 -0.00962 0.077954 0 14.67562 44.115 9.044 0.153827906 0 
GRF-2016 -0.01736 0.041356 0 14.52143 28.545 14.72 0.193372641 0 
GRF-2017 -0.03624 0.281483 1 15.45785 69.368 5.908 0.142252483 0 
GRF-2018 -0.01689 0.076097 1 15.45191 66.526 5.582 0.094333923 0 
IAG-2015 -0.05862 0.086503 0 15.94525 15.828 4.888 0.185818127 0 
IAG-2016 0.006891 0.103348 0 15.95843 11.626 6.42 
-
0.053724624 0 
IAG-2017 -0.00437 0.100182 1 15.94053 14.853 7.015 
-
0.021213889 0 
IAG-2018 -0.17285 0.103564 1 15.95523 20.792 7.781 10.61794421 0 
IBE-2015 -0.05847 0.698241 0 17.74024 33.278 -0.089 
-
0.261361452 0 
IBE-2016 0.034309 0.510587 0 17.69319 31.318 2.83 0.505432968 0 
IBE-2017 -0.00155 0.429468 1 17.65356 28.466 3.461 0.011193444 0 
IBE-2018 -0.02206 0.289752 1 17.6743 31.54 1.957 
-
0.184762754 0 
ITX-2015 -0.05081 0.736364 0 15.81987 54.327 27.995 0.174463373 0 
ITX-2016 0.014353 0.815377 0 15.923 55.057 29.265 0.169817249 0 
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ITX-2017 0.089969 0.843387 1 15.89132 50.545 31.162 0.103880634 0 
ITX-2018 -0.03251 0.193409 1 16.53812 20.091 68.764 0.614636008 0 
IDR-2015 0.063145 0.225876 0 14.8964 84.709 -18.893 
-
0.043620924 1 
IDR-2016 -0.03406 0.143487 0 15.00325 83.671 3.182 
-
0.024773902 0 
IDR-2017 -0.03955 0.142883 1 15.15885 79.298 2.93 0.015212622 0 
IDR-2018 0.015279 0.150202 1 15.13405 79.023 1.003 
-
0.492590375 0 
COL-2015 0.069065 0.187748 0 14.93952 46.206 9.153 0.10279417 0 
COL-2016 -0.05739 0.167845 0 15.11177 48.173 1.69 0.012668591 0 
COL-2017 0.004253 0.171995 1 15.46613 51.392 0.675 
-
0.161989615 0 
COL-2018 0.030759 0.164302 1 15.64224 50.169 0.572 0.973494982 0 
MEL-2015 0.075174 0.138739 0 14.62531 77.144 -0.386 0.101215259 1 
MEL-2016 0.013775 0.106063 0 14.64892 64.491 3.047 0.045593519 0 
MEL-2017 -0.02482 0.137163 1 14.66276 62.861 2.823 0.153057033 0 
MEL-2018 0.001382 0.116208 1 14.69856 62.544 2.558 
-
0.080822102 0 
MRL-2015 -0.01827 0.338676 0 14.98733 11.415 0.925 89.57552083 0 
MRL-2016 -0.05687 0.27956 0 15.97246 53.434 1.365 2.374644202 0 
MRL-2017 0.057198 0.137923 1 15.99683 55.653 0.881 0.630474511 0 
MRL-2018 -0.00781 0.10474 1 16.00905 56.518 2.382 0.000240366 0 
NTGY-2015 -0.08924 0.018331 0 17.31743 58.362 3.007 0.085564399 0 
NTGY-2016 -0.00535 0.023103 0 17.28365 58.088 3.064 
-
0.082486252 0 
NTGY-2017 0.036075 0.016252 1 17.34084 60.353 2.77 
-
0.012713404 0 
NTGY-2018 0.019017 0.123524 1 17.32831 48.643 15.747 
-
0.097314202 0 
PHM-2015 0.154603 0.153516 0 13.0445 27.902 -10.137 0.173803736 1 
PHM-2016 -0.06515 0.113167 0 13.07783 32.781 -1.206 
-
0.178620738 1 
PHM-2017 0.064682 0.315193 1 12.69757 44.902 -42.432 
-
0.041592138 1 
PHM-2018 -0.06148 0.207981 1 12.50966 45.331 -20.377 0.057641715 1 
REE-2015 -0.03153 0.087322 0 14.70285 5.987 20.911 0.075798855 0 
REE-2016 0.017348 0.111955 0 14.75479 6.447 21.782 0.096842873 0 
REE-2017 0.004844 0.108274 1 14.82729 7.042 22.882 0.12901835 0 
REE-2018 -0.06927 0.094841 1 14.93143 11.247 21.172 0.031302315 0 
REP-2015 0.074411 0.013711 0 16.89001 22.667 -2.139 -0.50728988 1 
REP-2016 -0.00826 0.193742 0 16.98284 16.117 13.388 1.63794604 0 
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REP-2017 0.036713 0.037497 1 16.93399 17.203 -3.86 
-
0.717255031 1 
REP-2018 -0.01945 0.236327 1 17.2495 37.545 1.783 0.585764294 0 
SGRE-2015 -0.03779 0.020579 0 13.77499 6.234 11.944 
-
0.325822579 0 
SGRE-2016 0.031694 0.04444 0 13.80361 5.003 10.435 0.893676703 0 
SGRE-2017 0.160275 0.611971 1 16.06746 15.827 -18.71 
-
0.751374903 1 
SGRE-2018 0.029757 0.12994 1 16.28637 31.945 0.484 7.358326731 0 
SLR-2015 -0.05089 0.059042 0 11.98455 56.825 -7.012 
-
0.310935069 1 
SLR-2016 -0.02484 0.071215 0 11.92907 57.681 -3.29 
-
0.241839458 1 
SLR-2017 0.071598 0.129571 1 11.8686 53.033 2.041 0.451936095 0 
SLR-2018 -0.08937 0.082932 1 12.27231 23.419 0.819 0.292055203 0 
TEF-2015 -0.01958 0.000159 0 18.25831 72.753 -1.759 
-
0.320979259 0 
TEF-2016 0.050785 0.061236 0 18.23748 75.646 3.442 
-
0.539142046 0 
TEF-2017 0.066124 0.088318 1 18.25657 76.592 0.322 0.360738863 0 
TEF-2018 0.001539 0.102057 1 18.26804 75.596 2.637 0.327921214 0 
VIS-2015 -0.09976 0.044141 0 13.16111 16.783 20.804 0.042428149 0 
VIS-2016 -0.03773 0.112472 0 13.22888 20.34 13.324 
-
0.034537846 0 
VIS-2017 0.033594 0.029237 1 13.25837 19.263 16.057 0.0534092 0 
VIS-2018 0.035736 0.053542 1 13.29761 21.593 15.716 0.108476225 0 
 
